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This paper builds on prior theory and research on attention and identity to examine whether and 
how industries publicly attend to external events. Events are critical triggers of institutional 
transformation and industry evolution.  Yet, they must first become the focus of public attention 
to have this effect. We draw on a paired case comparison of media coverage of eight non-routine 
events affecting the natural environment and the U.S. chemical industry. We employ both 
deductive and inductive analysis to develop a model and hypotheses to explain two research 
questions. First, what determines the initial public attention to an event? Second, when and why 
do certain events attain high and sustained levels of industry attention? A key inference is that 
whether an event receives industry level attention depends on either outsiders holding the 
industry accountable for the event, or insiders’ internal concerns with the industry image. We 
further infer that an event can be transformed into a critical issue for an industry, warranting 
sustained attention, if there is contestation with outsiders over the accountability for the event 
and its enactment and internal contradictions and challenges to the industry’s identity.  
 1 
Introduction 
Highly publicized events are critical triggers of institutional transformation (Fligstein, 
1990; Sewell, 1995; Hoffman, 1999). Such public occurrences, here called critical events are 
contextually dramatic happenings that focus sustained public attention and invite the collective 
definition or redefinition of social problems (Pride, 1995). Variously referred to as shocks 
(Fligstein, 1991), jolts (Meyer, 1982) or discontinuities (Lorange, Scott Morton and Ghoshal, 
1986), critical events have played a central role in fostering institutional change and industry 
evolution (Miles, 1982; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay and King, 1991). 
The publication of Silent Spring (Carson, 1962) provides an example. Silent Spring 
triggered, within weeks of its release, a political and cultural struggle between the chemical 
industry, scientific academies, conservation groups, and various government agencies on the 
industry's accountability for the ecological dangers of synthetic chemical production.  The book's 
author, marine biologist Rachel Carson, argued that chemical manufacturers, by barraging the 
environment with the synthetic pesticide, dichlorodiphenyltrichlorethane or DDT, were 
poisoning the entire food chain and ultimately ourselves.  For the US chemical industry, this 
book release was no small affair.  What at first was viewed as a possibly irritating event quickly 
enveloped into an issue of critical proportions. It became a threat to the image and identity 
(Dutton and Dukerich, 1991) of the entire chemical industry and a challenge to the technological 
preeminence of synthetic chemical production (Florman, 1976; Pillar, 1991).  This challenge 
triggered unprecedented public attention (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1985) from industry associations 
and individual companies.  Ultimately, Silent Spring facilitated changes governing chemical 
industry action, clearing the way for increased government controls on pesticide application.   
Past organizational research on critical events has focused on the processes of sense-
making (Isabella, 1990; Thomas, Clark, and Gioia, 1993; Gioia and Thomas. 1996) and the 
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construction of accounts (Elsbach, 1994). But despite the centrality of public attention to events 
in triggering institutional change, very little work in organizational studies has addressed why 
some events become the critical focus of attention while other events remain mostly unnoticed 
(Hoffman, 1999). . Not all events are attended equally. For example, why did Silent Spring 
receive substantial media attention in the trade journal Chemical Week while another major 
environmental book, The Limits to Growth received limited coverage? The former event led to 
significant institutional change in environmental policies and practices for the chemical industry. 
The latter faded in public attention. Why?  
Existing theory on public attention (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988) focuses on competition 
for attention among broad social problems, such as water pollution, energy crisis, and the 
homeless, but does not explain the level of attention to specific events or why some events 
become critical problems while others do not. To address this gap in the literature, we undertake 
an analytical case comparison of public attention to eight environmental events by the US 
chemical industry. We selected events relating to the natural environment for our study because 
they provide substantial variation in the level of public attention they have received by industry 
(Hoffman, 1997, 1999). This variation allows for an exploration of the determinants of public 
attention and inattention that avoids sampling on the dependent variable (King, Keohane & 
Verba, 1994). Building on methodologies of comparative studies of events (Skocpol and Somers, 
1980: Hicks, 1994; Mahoney, 1999) our objective is to construct a middle-range theory (Merton, 
1957; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988) of industry-level attention to external events.  
In the following sections we first discuss the general theoretical framework on industry-
level attention that guided our research study. Second, we discuss our data and methods used in 
the selection and analysis of the eight external events. We then present our cross-case analysis 
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out of which emerge our middle-range theory and explanatory hypotheses. Finally, we present 
the conclusions of our study and guides for further research.  
 
Theoretical Presuppositions and Research Questions 
We began our comparative analysis of cases with a set of orienting theoretical 
assumptions derived from attention-based theories of organizational action (March and Olsen, 
1976; Weick, 1979; Dutton, 1997; Ocasio, 1997). These theories view the environment as a 
source of constant input and stimulus for the organization, but posit that individuals and 
organizations have limited cognitive capabilities to deal with all available stimuli (Simon, 1947; 
March and Simon, 1958).  At the level of individuals, attention encompasses the noticing and 
focusing of time and effort on both the environmental stimuli requiring action and the available 
repertoire of responses which define that action (Ocasio, 1997).   
In this paper we focus on attention at the level of the industry. We introduce the concept 
of industry-level attention, which highlights how industry participants, in their communications 
and interactions with other industry participants selectively focus their attention on a limited set 
of issues, situations, and activities that represent potential problems or opportunities for the 
industry.  In particular we focus on industry attention to events external to the industry. In 
defining industry participants, we employ a field-level perspective (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
and include not only representatives from the producer organizations in the industry but also 
those from industry associations trade journals and other members of the industry’s field.  While 
ultimately, thinking and attending are activities of individuals, cultural and social processes at 
the level of an industry shape whether, when, where, why, and how decision-makers attend to 
issues and events (Douglas, 1986). 
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A critical principle of attention-based theories is the principle of selective attention 
(Simon, 1947; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Ocasio, 2000). This principle suggests that individuals, 
organizations, and industries will selectively attend to some external events, while ignoring 
others. Attention-based perspectives further posit that selective attention is driven not by the 
objective characteristics of the situation or event, but by its enactment in the environment 
(Weick, 1979, Ocasio, 2000). According to Weick (1979: 164), “enactment emphasize(s) that 
managers construct, rearrange, single out, and demolish many of the objective features of their 
surroundings.” Enactment actively orders the environment through the imposition of schemas 
and causal maps on the objects of action. Selective attention to events is driven by salience 
(Fiske and Taylor, 1991) and salience is shaped by how individuals, organizations, and industries 
enact events in the external environment.  
A second principle of attention-based perspective is that of situated cognition (Suchman, 
1987; Ross & Nisbett, 1991; Ocasio, 1997). This principle posits that the attention of industry 
participants to particular issues and answers is situated within the particular channels of 
communication through which they interact. In this paper, for example, we focus on the internal 
channels of the chemical industry through the trade press as compared to the external channels of 
the broader field through the general news media. For both, we draw upon the concept of public 
attention (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Fine, 1997; Rao, Greve and Davis, 1999). Hilgartner and 
Bosk (1988) treat public attention as a scarce resource for which potential issues compete for 
time and space. In their framework, competition for attention occurs within public arenas or 
institutionalized channels of communication and social interaction (Ocasio, 1997). But, where 
they look only at external attention to issues, we also consider attention by insiders and the 
linkage between them both.  Relevant arenas may include the press, professional conferences, 
congressional committees, and academic journals. Each arena possesses limited carrying 
 5 
capacity, so only a few events or issues gain public attention while most are ignored. According 
to the principle of situated attention, different public arenas will selectively focus attention on 
different issues and events in the external environment. 
A third principle of attention-based perspectives is that of the structural determination of 
attention. This suggests that how people think and how they attend to an event is a social and 
cultural process, shaped by the group, organization, industry, and organizational field (Ocasio, 
1995, 1997). Previous theory (Ocasio, 1997) suggests that whether a given issue attracts public 
attention depends upon whether the claims surrounding it are supported by the following social 
structures of attention: the rules of the game, status of the players, their social identity and 
structural position, and the available technology and resources. We draw upon these theoretical 
categories in our inductive analysis of the determinants of industry-level attention.  
We rely on identity as a key component of the social structures of attention (March and 
Olsen, 1976; Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; White, 1992; 
Ocasio, 1995).  We draw upon sociological (Douglas, 1986; White, 1992 and organizational 
(Albert and Whetten, 1985; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991) conceptions of identity. All these 
perspective emphasize the sameness of those who share a common collective identity and the 
distinctiveness, real or imagined, between the collective identities of different social groupings. 
We thereby define industry identity as the common rules, values, and systems of meaning by 
which industry participants establish rules of inclusion, competition, and social comparison 
among industry members, create distinctions within and between industries, and delimit industry 
boundaries. Industry identity emerges both from cognitive awareness among industry 
competitors about the nature of industry rivalry (Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989) and 
from collective responses to external threats to the collectivity (White, 1992). Industry identity 
embodies meaning and sense-making (Fiol, Hatch and Golden-Biddle, 1998) focused on 
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answering the following questions for its members: Who are we? What are we? What do we do 
that makes us distinctive as an industry? While industry identity, like organizational identity 
(Whetten and Godfrey, 1988) is often subject to contestation and change, it is an important 
influence upon actors’ collective behavior. For example, Florman (1976) and Hoffman (1997) 
describe the identity of the US petro-chemical industry in the 1950s as being embedded in beliefs 
in technological optimism. The self-perception was that member companies of this industry were 
improving the quality of life for individual Americans and the strength of the nation as a whole.  
Companies were proudly mobilizing America by fueling the record number of automobiles being 
produced and the economy's expanding industrial base, and providing miraculous new materials 
that were revolutionizing fields such as medicine, food production, and fashion. 
Following previous theory and research (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Dutton et al, 1994), 
we posit that the industry’s collective identity is shaped by its image. Industry image is defined 
as the industry’s internal perception of how outsiders think about them, their values, and their 
beliefs (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991) as distinct from the industry reputation, defined as the status 
ascribed to the industry by outsiders (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990).  While image results from 
internal sensemaking (Gioa and Thomas, 1996), reputation results from external attributions.  In 
sum, emergent norms of industry interaction, coupled with an examination of industry image and 
reputation, shape and constitute industry identity.  
We use the perspectives on industry attention and identity outlined above as an initial 
conceptual guide (Miles and Huberman, 1994) in our examination of industry attention to 
external events.  Building on this theoretical framework, the following research questions guide 
our theory development and hypothesis generation: 
Research Question 1: What explains whether and when some events receive public 
attention within an industry, while others are ignored?  
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Research question 1 seeks to explain variation in the levels of public attention and 
inattention to environmental events. In particular, we focus on how the social structures of 
attention and identification (March and Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 1997) shape industry attention and 
inattention to specific external events.  
Research Question 2: When and why do certain events attain high and sustained levels 
of industry attention? 
Research question 2 seeks to distinguish between short term levels of industry attention, 
and sustained levels of attention. While many events may receive industry attention at the initial 
outset, only a small subset of these events receives continued attention and becomes a critical 
issue to the industry. Here we will explore the relationships between the process by which the 
event is enacted over time (Isabella, 1990; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991; Barr, 1998) and the 
degree of sustained public attention accorded to an event within an industry. 
 
Data and Method 
Our approach to developing middle range theories (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988) builds on methods of causal inference used by historical sociologists in 
comparative studies of events (Skocpol and Somers, 1980; Ragin, 1987; Quadagno and Knapp, 
1992; Hicks, 1994). This research uses historical comparisons primarily for the purpose of 
making causal inferences about macro-level structures and processes (Skocpol and Somers, 
1980: 181). Unlike grounded theory approaches (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), which are more 
purely inductive, our comparative case methodology begins with a set of research questions and 
categories derived from previous theories on organizational attention and identity to draw 
specific causal inferences and testable hypotheses (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
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Empirical Context of the Study 
The empirical context for our study deals with the emergence of events related to the 
natural environment and environmental protection.  This is a rich area for research.  Over the 
past thirty-five years, environmentalism has promoted rapid social change and has been 
propelled by formative, and at times sensational events (Scheffer, 1991; Goetlieb, 1993; 
Hoffman, 1997), while other events have received less notice.   
Central to this rich social history has been the involvement of the US chemical industry.  
This industry has been singled out in public opinion polls as the pre-eminent environmental 
threat from the 1970s (Erskine, 1971) through the 1990s (Cambridge Reports/Research 
International, 1992).  The volume of the industry’s waste streams exceeds that of the second 
most polluting industry sector (primary metals) by more than a factor of two (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 1992).  And in general, its role has been prominent in major environmental 
catastrophes such as Bhopal, Love Canal and Seveso.  Given this centrality in the environmental 
realm, the chemical industry is a prime candidate for our study.   
 
Sample of Events 
We began by developing a set of environment-related events for study between the years 
1960 and 1995, an era marked by many as the “modern environmental movement” (Scheffer, 
1991; Goetlieb, 1993).  In the spirit of theory building, we sought variance across the events in 
our sample (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1991).  These were not, however, meant to be 
representative of all possible types of occurrences.  We first identified an event classification 
scheme presented by Hannigan (1995) which included milestones , catastrophes and 
legal/administrative happenings.  Next, drawing from a broad set of event candidates developed 
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by Hoffman (1999: 371), we selected individual events from each category in complementary 
pairs for analysis, based on similar characteristics and attributes.   
We selected a total of eight events for case comparison. Given the sample size and 
selection criteria, this sample set may create possible biases if used for drawing inferences.  We 
believe, however, that our sample set and methodology of comparison analysis offers advantages 
in theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989). While it is unlikely that we could develop a sample 
that represents all possible types of environmental events, we feel that there is more explanatory 
power in choosing a small number of case comparisons as opposed to a more limited review of a 
larger number of cases.  Descriptive differences uncovered through in-depth comparisons of 
seemingly similar events should reveal characteristic insights to the attentional processes that 
guide event enactment and interpretation.   
We first selected four events that were considered extremely important in the source 
literature: the publication of Silent Spring (1962); the First Earth Day (1970); Love Canal, 
(1978); and, the Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989).  We then selected four comparable events for case 
comparison: the publication of The Limits to Growth (1972); the re-enactment of Earth Day on 
its twentieth anniversary (1990); the Cuyahoga River Fire (1969), and the Burmah Agate oil spill 
(1979). These eight cases are listed in their comparison pairs in table 1 and briefly described 
here.   
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
1. The Cuyahoga River Fire, 1969.  On June 23, 1969, the Cuyahoga River caught fire 
for twenty-four minutes, causing $50,000 damage to two key railroad trestles in Cleveland Ohio. 
The cause was attributed to oily wastes dumped into the river from waterfront industries and the 
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event has been credited by many as a touchstone for the genesis of the modern environmental 
movement (Opheim, 1993)..  
2.  Love Canal, 1978.  In 1976, residents of a neighborhood of Niagara Falls mobilized 
to demand government action in investigating and remediating the appearance of chemical 
wastes in their neighborhood. On August 2, 1978, the New York Department of Health declared 
the area a health hazard and, with aid from the federal government, began buying homes and 
evacuating their occupants.  It was determined that the neighborhood had been built on and 
around an abandoned waste site into which the Hooker Electro-Chemical Company had buried 
21,800 tons of chemical waste from 1942 until 1953.   
3.  The Burmah Agate Oil Spill, 1979.  On November 1, 1979, the freighter, Mimosa 
rammed the Liberian tanker, Burmah Agate, while anchored off the port of Galveston, Texas.  
The ship and its leaking cargo burned for five days, out of which leaked 10.7 million (US) 
gallons of crude oil.  A large portion of this oil washed up on the beaches of Galveston over the 
ensuing weeks. 
4. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 1989.  On March 24, 1989, the Exxon oil super-tanker 
Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound in Alaska. In all, 10.8 million 
(US) gallons of crude oil coated about 1,200 miles of shoreline.  Wildlife loss and charges of 
mismanagement resulted in unprecedented legal judgments against Exxon reaching over $5 
billion with many cases still pending.  
5.  The First Earth Day, 1970.  On April 22, 1970, nearly 20 million Americans took 
part in a national event on college campuses all over the country.  Festivities focused public 
attention on the mounting awareness of environmental degradation and targeted much of their 
protest against corporations. For many, this event marked the coalescence of a new 
"environmental movement" which involved constituents from all of society (Gottlieb, 1993).   
 11 
6.  Earth Day, 1990. On April 22, 1990, Earth Day was reenacted on its twentieth 
anniversary. An estimated 200 million people participated in 140 nations. But, through funding 
of the days events and staging of special demonstration of their "green" activities, corporations 
were not villians but prominent participants and organizing supporters. 
7.  The Publication of Silent Spring, 1962.  As discussed in the introduction, on 
September 27, 1962, the Houghton-Mifflin Company published the book Silent Spring.  Rachel 
Carson, the book's author, charged that widespread application of the pesticide DDT and other 
synthetic chemicals were disrupting the "web of life," posing a hazard to all living organisms 
including humans.  
8.  The Publication of The Limits to Growth, 1972.  Released on March 2, 1972, The 
Limits to Growth (Meadow, Meadows and Randers, 1972) documented the results of a computer 
study based on the system dynamics model perfected at MIT.  It concluded that mankind faced 
an uncontrollable and disastrous collapse within 100 years unless it moved speedily to establish a 
"global equilibrium" in which growth of the population and industry output were stabilized.  
 
Data Sources 
To capture data on event attention in the US chemical industry in this study, we focused on how 
public attention is situated within one particular arena or communication channel which we see 
as central to these processes, the business press. While the business press is one among many 
public arenas within an industry, it offers some important advantages.  Trade journals are one of 
the most critical communication and procedural channels through which industry attention is 
structured, providing both analyses of events and issues, and instruction to their readers on their 
relative importance (Clinton, 1996). Research on the impact of trade journals shows that their 
structural position as a shared reference for knowledge transfer among industry constituents 
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(Nederhof and Miejer, 1995) makes them both a channel of communication in the early stages of 
industry related policy process (Hollifield, 1997) and a common reservoir for available 
information and interpretations. As such, the role they play in attentional processes is multiple.  
First, they act as a common source of information, creating an historical record relevant to their 
readership based on both insiders' and outsiders' interpretations of data.  Second, they act as an 
internal constituent of an industry, deciding what events to attend to and offering analysis and 
interpretation of their criticality to their readership. They are a dual force “for socialization of the 
young and attitude change in the old” (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz and Sechrest, 1966: 78). 
Third, they act as conduits to other communication channels and public arenas. Trade journals 
actively scan other public media for their coverage of industry issues and events, recording 
outsiders’ accounts of industry activities and industry reputation, thereby serving as linkages 
between outsiders’ and insiders’ public attention.  
The limitations in this data source are clear as well.  Trade journals can be active agents 
engaged in processes of impression management, both by design and by cultural bias.  They are 
organizational actors whose output is subject to the political pressures exerted by powerful 
figures and organizations within the industry (Molotch and Lester, 1975).  And journal coverage 
itself is the product of a fixed system (Schlesinger, 1978), inhabited by individuals who are pre-
selected for their biases toward the journal’s constituency, in this case industry.  Trade journal 
coverage is, by definition, a biased interpretation of events and issues, where the bias is likely to 
reflect the interests and identities of its core readers and sources of information (Molotch and 
Lester, 1975). The culture and social structure prevailing within the industry shape its content.  
As a source of our data set, we reviewed event coverage in the trade journal, Chemical 
Week, and supplemented that analysis with coverage reviews in the newspapers, the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal. Chemical Week was our internal industry source, representing 
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a reasonable indicator of the interests, identity, and perspectives of the chemical industry as they 
react to external events. The New York Times and Wall Street Journal were our external sources. 
The New York Times was used to represent externally situated perceptions of these events located 
within the general public.  And the Wall Street Journal was used to represent perceptions within 
the financial community.  In each case, the level and content of media coverage was analyzed to 
draw inferences about what issues and events were being addressed by the media constituency, 
as well as to what extent and through what types of interpretation and presentation.  Chemical 
Week was used to represent internal industry attention to external events.  
As our primary source, Chemical Week was one of several trade journals available.  Two 
other prominent journals — Chemical & Engineering News (C&EN) and Chemical Engineering 
(CE) — serve this industry sector as well.  As our rationale for choosing, we found Chemical 
Week to have coverage that was specialized to the interests of the chemical industry.  Both 
C&EN and CE serve both the chemical and petroleum industries and C&EN targets academic 
and governmental audiences in its readership.  Given this dilution in constituency, Chemical 
Week stood out as a central dedicated communication channel within the US chemical industry.  
 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Our process of identifying and coding articles describing our event sample differed 
slightly by data source.  The process ranged from initial broad-scale screening to final analysis of 
specific article content.  For the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, we began with the 
“Year in Review” compendia for each journal and collected gross data on number of articles 
covering a particular issue including the date, page and title of the article.  Then each article was 
reviewed for content to uncover clues about the enactment of the event.  Based on our theoretical 
interest on the social structures of attention (March and Olsen, 1976; Ocasio, 1997), we focused 
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on particular players or constituencies mentioned, experts cited, companies blamed or praised, 
differing degrees and types of blame assessed, data presented, etc.  For Chemical Week, we also 
used the “Year in Review” compendia and the Business Periodicals Index to identify and code 
the number of specific articles on a particular event.  But, in this data, we also went deeper, 
scanning the journals themselves for a more accurate and complete review of articles of 
importance.  We began our review six months before the event and ended 3 years after the event, 
searching for similar content as with the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.   
With such content data, we began our analysis.  We used the number of Chemical Week 
articles as a measure of industry-level public attention. We used New York Times and Wall Street 
Journal coverage as a measure of public attention by outsiders. These measures implicitly treat 
attention as a discrete activity, with each article as a separate occurrence of attentional 
processing within an industry’s communication channels (Ocasio, 1997).  The measures of 
attention and interpretations of industry events gathered from press publications were 
complemented with data and observations obtained from secondary sources (Erskine 1971, 
Evernden, 1991, Scheffer, 1991; Schmidheiny, 1992; Goetlieb, 1993; Cairncross, 1995; 
Hoffman, 1997). 
 
Case Comparison Method 
We began our analysis by undertaking between case comparisons of industry-level 
attention based on existing theory, seminar discussions and pilot tests on other types of events. 
We proceeded to review event coverage in relation to our developing model of event attention 
within the US chemical industry.  Our analysis was guided by a meta-theory derived from 
research on attention and identity, as described above. We relied on an analytical process that 
combines induction with deduction (Miles and Huberman, 1994) to develop an explicit model of 
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how the industry structures attention to non-routine occurrences.1 We used data reduction and 
data display methods to draw and verify our conclusions. The analytical process that followed 
involved repeated iterations, moving back and forth between our emerging model and the 
quantitative and qualitative data.  Through successive iterations, we converged on a final model 
that best fit the empirical data and provided a coherent theoretical explanation of the industry-
level attentional process. In addition to the theoretical model, we proceeded to develop a set of 
hypotheses inferred from the case observations. 
 
Analysis of Cases 
Question 1: Event Attention 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 presents the analysis of discrete levels of attention for the events selected both for 
the first month and for the first year immediately following the event.  We found several patterns 
of interest that helped guide our answers to the first research question—what social structures of 
attention help determine whether an event is attended to by the industry or not? First, two events 
received no attention in Chemical Week: the Cuyahoga River Fire and the Burmah Agate oil 
spill. Two events received high levels of attention that persisted through the year: the publication 
                                                 
1 Traditionally, theory-testing methods (using primarily quantitative data) are seen to rely on deduction while theory 
generation (using primarily qualitative data) is linked to induction. In reality most, if not all, research, whether 
qualitative or quantitative, involves both induction and deduction. We follow Miles and Huberman (1994: 14) by 
beginning with an explicit theoretical framework. Like theirs, our approach is more deductive than most other 
studies that employ cross-comparison of cases. We also follow Miles and Huberman by including, as part of our 
analytical approach, verification that the evidence supports our hypotheses. Despite the inclusion of data verification 
in our analysis, our exercise is one of theory development rather than theory testing, because our theoretical model 
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of Silent Spring and Love Canal.  One event, Earth Day 1990 had high level of coverage in the 
first month, and moderate levels of attention overall, but no industry (or external) press coverage 
in the subsequent year. In short, the initial findings show great variance in the levels of insider 
and outsider public attention among the events studied. 
Our initial examination of the data supports the proposition that selective attention to 
events is not shaped by the objective characteristics of an event but by its enactment. For 
example, several of our sample events were designed as control pairs for analysis based on 
environmental and technical measures of similarity.  The Exxon Valdez and the Burmah Agate 
oil spills, for example, were of roughly the same magnitude in terms of oil spilled - 10.7 million 
(US) gallons.  Yet, this objective measure does not reveal the reasons why the Exxon Valdez spill 
resulted in a public outcry and government response that was unprecedented while the Burmah 
Agate spill was hardly noticed.  Internally as well, the Burmah Agate was not mentioned in 
Chemical Week, while the Exxon Valdez garnered coverage, modest in Chemical Week and 
extreme in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.  Public attention was not based on the 
amount of oil spilled. 
We also found little evidence for the idea that the level of external media coverage 
explains public attention at the industry level.  Table 2 shows that, of the eight events studied, the 
Exxon Valdez and Earth Day 1970 were noted as critical events by the general press and financial 
communities, while receiving low or moderate levels of attention by the chemical industry. 
Those that received the greatest public attention by the chemical industry — Silent Spring and 
Love Canal — received the second and third most coverage in the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal.  This suggested that to understand the effect of external attention we had to focus 
                                                                                                                                                             
and hypotheses emerged from the data.  Explicit testing of our emergent theory and hypotheses must be conducted 
with new data, as part of future research.  
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not on the level of attention they received, but on whether and how events were enacted (Weick, 
1979) by the internal and external press.   
Enactment of Events. We focused on the paired comparisons of how comparable types 
of events were enacted, both by outsiders and by insiders. The contrast between the level of 
public attention to the Cuyahoga River fire and the contrasting case of Love Canal was initially 
the most striking, as the complete inattention to the fire in Chemical Week, the New York Times, 
or the Wall Street Journal was quite unexpected.this fire was a rather unusual event in that it was 
oily waste and debris on the water’s surface that was burning, leaving two wooden railroad 
bridges damaged and inoperable in its wakeThe lack of business press attention to this river fire 
became an important puzzle in our attempt to elucidate the causes of industry-level attention to 
events. In fact, while the concept of a river so polluted as to ignite would be exceptional by 
present-day standards, we were equally surprised to find no coverage in the national press. Why 
was this event, later immortalized by environmentalists (Opheim, 1993; Browner, 1994), and 
made the subject of a popular song by Randy Newman not attended to by the business or 
national press?  
We found a very different level of attention for our contrasting case, the Love Canal. 
Unlike the Cuyahoga River Fire, this event caught the attention of Chemical Week, as well as the 
New York Times and Wall Street Journal.  To explain the distinction between these two events, 
we looked deeper into their coverage — how they were enacted by media sources both internal 
and external to the industry.  Given our lack of coverage for the Cuyahoga River fire, we 
supplemented our data with coverage from the local newspaper, the Cleveland Plain Dealer, 
where the fire garnered a front-page story the day after the occurrence and subsequent follow-up 
through the week.  These stories, however, were not about water pollution or industry 
contamination. Rather, they were about the hazards associated with "oil slick" fires.  None of the 
 18 
articles assigned blame to any specific company or industry. Editorials challenged the state and 
city to find the industries responsible "if it can ever be determined who they were." They treated 
the incident as an embarrassment to the city, complaining that “we are tired of Cleveland being 
the butt of a joke” and criticizing the "the usual amount of oily gunk that has given the river and 
the city a bad name for years" (The Plain Dealer, 6/25/69: 10-A). 
In contrast, the declaration of a health hazard in the neighborhood of Love Canal was enacted as 
a pollution issue first and foremost. And from the start, the event had a clear villain who was 
assessed blame - the company which had created the buried toxic waste, the Hooker Chemical 
Company.  Early New York Times articles reported angry calls for cleanup financial assistance 
from Hooker, "either voluntarily or through court mandated cost sharing funds" (New York 
Times, 8/6/78: 24).  But the event also called into question the past disposal of hazardous wastes 
by all members of the chemical industry.  As part of extensive and continuing coverage that 
included each day of the first week, the New York Times released a list of New York firms using 
toxic chemicals and a pledge by the NYS Environmental Conservation Commissioner to probe 
their waste handling practices (New York Times, 4/9/78: 1). In contrast, Chemical Week coverage 
began a week after the announcement, on August 9.  While this week delay is an artifact of the 
journal's weekly publication format, the extent of that coverage began low in volume and 
content.  The first coverage was only one article, filling less than one column and describing the 
specific facts of the case as they applied to Hooker Chemical.  Deeper coverage did not begin 
until August 16. First, an editorial defended both Hooker as bearing "no legal liability" and "the 
overall record of chemical producers acting to the benefit of man." It also argued that action 
should be taken "not by Washington or state capitals but by the chemical industry" (Chemical 
Week, 8/16/78: 5).  Second, a two-page article in the same issue continued the defense of 
industry practice in waste disposal. While acknowledging that "there is really no way to tell", it 
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argued that "it seems unlikely that a combination of circumstances could lead to similar 
circumstances" elsewhere in the country (Chemical Week, 8/16/67: 15).   
Outsiders’ Enactment of Events: The Attribution of Accountability. Our examination 
of the Cuyahoga River fire and Love Canal suggests that how non-routine events are enacted 
(Weick, 1979) by external media shapes whether they receive public attention by the industry 
press.  In comparing these two events we observed that they differed on whether the industry and 
its members were held accountable or not. While the Cuyahoga River fire could have been 
attributed to chemical industry activities, no chemical companies were named within the local 
press and no articles were written at the national level.  Instead, the fire was enacted as a problem 
for the city, not the industry, and Cleveland was held accountable for the event. Public attention 
was directed towards Cleveland’s pollution problems. While the reputation of Cleveland was at 
stake, the chemical industry’s reputation was unaffected by the fire. We infer that this failure to 
hold the industry accountable for the event helps explain why it did not receive attention by 
Chemical Week. Similarly, it appears that Cleveland’s accountability for the event was not of 
sufficient interest to the New York Times or the Wall Street Journal. 
On the other hand, as we discussed above, responsibility for the Love Canal waste dump 
was attributed directly to chemical industry activities.  External sources held the industry and one 
of its members, Hooker, accountable for the event. Both the Cuyahoga River fire and Love Canal 
show that enactments of events trigger an attribution of accountability (Tetlock, 1990) in the 
public media. The key difference between the two events is which collective actor is held 
accountable for the event. In those cases where the chemical industry is held accountable, the 
event becomes socially salient for industry members and therefore receives public attention in 
the industry press. 
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According to Tetlock (1990), information processing by individuals is a political process, 
as individuals are concerned whether others hold them accountable for specific actions or events. 
According to this view, a key aspect of the enactment of an event is the determination of 
accountability.  Attributions for the causes of events are characterized by holding particular 
individuals, groups, firms, industries, or sectors accountable for their occurrence. Consequently, 
we propose that Tetlock's insights on accountability at the individual level may be extended to 
the industry-level. An individual’s concerns with their accountability is affected by their 
individual identity. Similarly, and as suggested by our case comparison, industry members are 
concerned with the industry’s accountability for an action or event, as shaped by the collective 
identity of industry members. Industry members are concerned with the accountability for their 
actions and outcomes based on how this accountability shapes their reputation (Elsbach, 1993).  
Outsiders can directly influence this process by holding an industry and its members accountable 
for actions, events, and outcomes.  Industry members and the industry press are concerned with 
the industry’s accountability. This concern with an industry’s accountability for an event makes 
the event salient for industry members and triggers initial industry attention.   
Based on the contrasts between these two events, we initially hypothesized that if there is 
not outsiders' attribution of accountability, then the event is unlikely to be attended. In examining 
our remaining cases we found, however, that outsider accountability, while a sufficient condition 
to trigger attention to an event, does not appear to be a necessary condition.  This led us to 
consider not just outsiders’ attributions of accountability, but insiders’ attributions in shaping 
public attention by the industry. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
 21 
Looking at the coverage comparisons in table 3, the relation between external  and 
internal examination appears to show that external attribution of accountability is a sufficient 
condition to generate industry-level attention. Where players external to the industry attributed 
accountability for certain events to the chemical industry — Silent Spring, the first Earth Day, 
Love Canal, and Earth Day 1990 — the chemical industry paid attention to the event.  But other 
events where external accountability was absent — The Limits to Growth, and the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill — were also attended to by the industry press. This suggests that other dynamics were at 
play.  We sought our clues as to what those dynamics might be in the next pair of cases. 
Insiders’ Enactment of Events: Attention to Industry Image. The Burmah Agate and 
the Exxon Valdez oil spills were of similar proportions (roughly 10.7 million (US) gallons. In 
neither case would it be likely that outsiders could attribute accountability for the event to the 
chemical industry.  Outsiders to the industry enacted the Burmah Agate as a maritime issue and 
the Exxon Valdez as an oil pollution issue.  In addition, external coverage of the Burmah Agate 
was light compared to the Exxon Valdez, addressing the attempts by firefighters to extinguish the 
flames on the floating wreck, keep the undamaged oil-filled compartments from rupturing and 
contain the released oil.  Stories about clean-up efforts on the Texas beaches were barely 
covered.  External coverage of the Exxon Valdez was intense, chronicling a story of a damaged 
environment, injured or killed animals and alleged mismanagement by the Exxon Corporation 
and its employees.  This made the company into a visible villain and the primary subject of 
coverage.  While enacted in different forms, each were catastrophes involving oil, not chemical 
industry activities.  But, while the Burmah Agate received no attention within Chemical Week, 
the Exxon Valdez was the subject of several articles.  Our question was why?   
In searching for this answer, we became interested in exploring the linkages between the 
construct of accountability and challenges to the image of the industry.  Linking existing theory 
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to our inferences about the effects of accountability we examined whether the search for 
accountability could take the form of an examination of the event’s threat to the image of the 
industry by internal constituents.  In the case of the Exxon Valdez, Chemical Week coverage 
centered on the use of chemical and biological dispersants to break up the spill, particularly those 
developed by Exxon Chemical, a wholly owned subsidiary of Exxon Corp.  The success or 
failure of these dispersants could reflect on the image of the industry with respect to its ability to 
use its technology to find a solution to this environmental problem.  So, while direct 
accountability in either case had no implications for the chemical industry, the industry’s concern 
with image was triggered, not by who was accountable for the Exxon Valdez spill, but for its 
cleanup.  This led us to consider how the industry’s self examination of its image led to industry 
attention for the event.  
Linking accountability to image, the determinants of industry attention were most clearly 
elucidated by contrasting Silent Spring with The Limits to Growth. While Silent Spring 
represented outsiders’ attribution of the industry’s accountability, The Limits to Growth did not.  
Its critique of industrial activity was extremely wide in scope, offering no direct assessment of 
blame for chemical industry activities in particular.  Both events did, on the other hand, present 
challenges to industry image that triggered internal attention.  And, interestingly, we found that 
the challenge posed by the second event was related to the first.  Silent Spring challenged the 
identity of the entire chemical industry, not just of DDT producers.  The Limits to Growth 
triggered an examination of whether this book was describing “The Ultimate Silent Spring?” 
(Chemical Week, 3/15/72: 40). Given the effect of Silent Spring on the image and identity of the 
chemical industry, the publication of The Limits to Growth triggered an internal examination of 
the potential impacts of the new book on the industry’s image. 
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The examples of the first Earth Day in 1970 and the Earth Day anniversary in 1990 
helped to validate our inferences of the roles of outsiders’ attributions of accountability and 
internal examination of image. Each was a national celebration, designed to increase awareness 
and understanding of the threats to the natural environment.  But, in fact, each was enacted in a 
very different way, triggering different attentional processes within Chemical Week. Both of 
these related events received attention within Chemical Week.  Yet, each for different reasons.  
The first Earth Day represented outsiders’ (student protesters and the media) attribution of the 
chemical industry’s accountability for environmental pollution .  Coverage in the New York 
Times highlighted how organizers "refused to accept money from industries causing pollution" 
(New York Times, 4/22/70: 35) and described how industry and government officials were the 
primary targets of protests (New York Times, 4/23/70: 1).  Yet these events triggered no internal 
examination within Chemical Week of the industry’s image.  The event was constructed as just 
another day of protest for which chemical manufacturers saw little legitimacy.  As an 
examination of the press coverage revealed, the industry felt it needed just a “Chance to state its 
case” (Chemical Week, 3/4/70: 64), and the grounds for its activities could be legitimated. . The 
different enactments of the event in Chemical Week and the New York Times suggests that while 
outsiders’ attribution of accountability affected the external reputation of the industry, the 
chemical industry remained unconcerned with its image, as they discounted the importance of 
student protests and did not see their identity threatened.  Following the event, despite the 
student protests, Chemical Week framed the day as a success — “On balance it was a good day 
for industry” (Chemical Week, 4/29/70: 8), “industry achieved a rational dialogue and avoided a 
hostile confrontation with militant young anti-pollutionists” (Chemical Week, 4/29/70: 33).  
For Earth Day 1990, the attribution of accountability of the industry by outsiders was 
enacted in positive, rather than negative terms.  The New York Times reported that “this multi-
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million dollar orchestration of the event bore little resemblance to the grass roots movement 
driving the event twenty years before” (New York Times, 2/22/90: 26). The chemical industry 
was a central and cooperative participant in a relatively peaceful event.  In addition, there was a 
proactive internal examination of the event’s implications for the industry image. Chemical Week 
began coverage of the event four days early with a "special report" calling the event a "challenge 
and an opportunity for the CPI (chemical processing industry)" (Chemical Week, 4/28/90: 20). 
Coverage within the New York Times began before the event as well, but this coverage focused 
on the activities of planners and the festivities for the day.  Articles focused on protests against 
"corporate destruction of the environment" (New York Times, 4/24/90: B5) and corporate 
intentions to look "green.". As in the coverage of the industry’s efforts to abate pollution in the 
Exxon Valdez spill, the journal’s coverage of Earth Day served to preserve the industry identity 
as a positive social force.  Chemical Week devoted a cover page story to the event, proclaiming 
that, despite “barely noticing the first Earth Day 20 years ago” (Chemical Week, 4/18/90: 20), 
they now abided by the ethic that “Earth day is every day for us” (Chemical Week, 4/18/90: 5).  
An examination of press coverage reveals the industry’s concern with preserving its image. The 
special issue was a collection of articles that described the environmental protection activities of 
major corporations such as Ciba-Geigy, Monsanto, and Dow Chemical, all emphasizing the great 
strides made by chemical companies in the environmental arena. 
The two Earth Days highlight how both outsiders’ attribution of accountability and 
insiders internal examination of event implications can trigger industry attention.  Love Canal 
highlights how both forces can play in tandem.  Outsider attribution was directed at a central 
character in the chemical industry (Hooker) while the event in general called into question the 
responsibility of all chemical manufacturers in the past formation of abandoned hazardous waste 
sites and their present-day waste management practices.    
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To sum up thus far, we have identified two constructs that will trigger industry attention 
to external events.  We inferred that outsiders’ attributions of the industry’s accountability for the 
event (as evidenced by accounts in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times) can trigger 
industry attentional processes.  We also inferred that internal examination of the threat posed by 
the event to the image of the industry can trigger industry attentional processes (as measured by 
accounts in Chemical Week).  Combining the two, we also infer that either form can be at play, 
both singularly or in tandem.  The combined evidence drawn from the eight cases lead us to posit 
the following:  
Hypothesis 1: Outsiders’ Attribution of Accountability.  The greater the extent to which 
outsiders attribute direct accountability and responsibility to the industry for the event, the greater 
the likelihood that it will be attended to in the business press.  
Hypothesis 2: Insiders’ Examination of Implications for the Industry’s Image. The 
greater the extent to which insiders examine an external event as a potential threat to the 
industry’s image, the greater the likelihood that it will be attended to in the business press.  
For Hypotheses 1 and 2, we further considered the direction of causality –whether 
outsiders’ attribution of accountability and insiders’ examination of image were causes or effects 
of public attention. For hypothesis 1, outsiders’ attribution of accountability to the chemical 
industry were reported in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal prior to press coverage in 
Chemical Week. This temporal sequence strongly supports the view that outsider’s attribution of 
accountability was a cause rather than a consequence of industry-level attention, at least initially. 
Once attended to, these outsiders’ attributions are likely to be reinforcing. For hypothesis 2 the 
evidence is more indirect as we cannot observe internal enactments of the threats of industry 
image until they are recorded in the industry press. While data limitations do not allow us to 
discard the alternative hypothesis that the decision to publish causes an internal examination of 
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industry image, it is significant to note that for those events receiving industry attention without 
external attributions of accountability, the examination of industry image was a key component 
of the first article published. This is true both for The Limits to Growth and for the Exxon Valdez 
oil spill.  This suggests that the examination of the industry image temporally preceded the 
external attribution of accountability. However, public attention to an external event is likely to 
lead to increased self-examination of an industry image (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), whether 
the initial public attention was driven by outsiders’ or insiders’ initial enactments of the external 
events. 
The Social Structures of Industry Attention. With the search for accountability of an 
event and the threats to the industry’s image established as two possible routes toward triggering 
event attention, we were interested in understanding more deeply how these two forces can 
manifest themselves in the specific process of event attention.  Consistent with our first research 
question, we decided to examine the social structures of attention (Ocasio, 1997). In table 4 we 
summarize our analysis, presenting a comparison of the rules of the game, the status of the 
players and the implications for the core technology.  To ascertain the causal direction in our 
analysis, we examined the social structures of attention as they existed prior to the event being 
publicly recorded in the industry press. As Fine (1997) suggests in his study of public attention 
to the “problems of Hollywood,” to understand how events are enacted, we must first examine 
the social conditions prevalent at the time they are enacted.  Our objective was to examine the 
theoretical categories drawn from previous research on attentional processing, and use these 
categories in a between case comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989) of factors to infer more specific 
mechanisms on how they influence attention to events.  
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
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We first considered how the shift over time in the environmental strategies and rules of the game 
within the industry might affect industry attentional processes. The rules of the game are the 
formal and informal principles of action that guide decision-makers in the industry. Here we note 
that the chemical’s industry’s concern with its image is affected by the prevailing rules, norms 
and beliefs regarding environmental issues and the corporation’s role in protecting it.  Hoffman 
(1999) highlights four stages of development in these rules that we use to identify prevailing 
rules of the game. In the first stage (Industrial Environmentalism, 1962 - 1970) industry 
remained firm in its beliefs that environmental problems could be solved independently and 
through technological development.  In stage two (Regulatory Environmentalism, 1971-1982), 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) became the arbiter of environmental rules and 
norms, and environmental management became synonymous with regulatory compliance.  In 
stage three (Environmentalism as Social Responsibility, 1983 - 1988) industry began to 
acknowledge that the environmental problem will not disappear and began to take a more 
prominent role in establishing environmental rules and norms as a signal of its social 
responsibility. In the fourth stage (Strategic Environmentalism, 1989 - 1993) industry began to 
take a pro-active stance on environmental protection as it once again perceived the problem as 
one it could handle itself. In this latter stage, outsiders’ attributions and internal image became 
tightly linked with environmental issues as corporate initiatives to develop a "green" identity 
became more critical. An examination of the relationship between industry-level attention and 
the rules of the game led us to posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The Congruence of the Rules of the Game with Responsibility for the 
Event. The greater the congruence of the rules of the game with potential industry accountability 
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for the external event, the greater the examination of industry image and the greater the level of 
industry attention to external events. 
A comparison between the first Earth Day and its reenactment in 1990 as well as a 
comparison between the Burmah Agate and Exxon Valdez oil spills highlight the phenomenon 
described by hypothesis three.  While each of these event pairs were constructed around similar 
objectives, industry placed more importance on the latter events as they were consistent with its 
efforts to project a "green" identity. But an in-depth examination of Silent Spring and its 
comparison with The Limits to Growth suggested to us the need to look for further structural 
determinants of industry attention.  
While external and internal coverage of Silent Spring was high and the event was enacted 
in a way that clashed with the existing rules of the game - namely the preeminence of 
technological development (Florman, 1976; Hoffman, 1997) - attention to The Limits to Growth 
was low. To explain why, we observed that the attentional processes related to these two events 
were very different. First, the publication of Silent Spring triggered the involvement of many 
high status players.  It was serialized in the New Yorker magazine and drew attention from many 
prominent actors including President Kennedy, the Department of Agriculture, the National 
Academy of Sciences, the Audubon Society, the Manufacturing Chemists Association, the 
National Agricultural Chemicals Association, and the Audubon Society.  Chemical Week articles 
asked questions such as "what to do about Rachel Carson" (Chemical Week, 9/22/62: 107) and 
focused heavily on the commentary of executives from corporations such as Monsanto - which 
published a parody of the book (Chemical Week, 10/6/62: 23) - and American Cyanamid - which 
devoted one its top research scientists as spokesman for the chemical industry in telling the 
"industry's pesticide story" (Chemical Week, 11/10/62: 29).  Likewise, The Limits to Growth 
triggered the involvement of prominent actors such as its sponsors, the Club of Rome and MIT, 
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as well as prominent scientists, government officials, and corporate representatives but not to the 
same degree as Silent Spring.   
This leads us to infer that an event is more likely to trigger insiders’ examination of 
industry image if it targets a high status player or if the attributing actor is itself a high status 
player.  The status of the players involved in the interpretation of an event grants it social 
saliency (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) within the industry.  High status players are the individuals and 
groups who, through their social influence, power and control, influence and regulate the 
decision and activities relative to the event in question.  They are more representative of the 
acknowledged image of the entire field and serve to intensify interest and increase attention on a 
particular occurrence.  For example, in the Cuyahoga River fire, no players were named by the 
Plains Dealer and in the case of the Burmah Agate spill, only a low status player was triggered 
— the British Burmah Oil Company which owned the tanker.  The Exxon Valdez, of course, 
triggered the high profile identity of the Exxon Corporation. In the case of Love Canal, initial 
New York Times attention focused heavily, not only on Hooker Chemical, but also on the high 
status of the US Army, publishing charges that the agency had dumped chemical warfare 
materials into the canal (New York Times, 8/2/78: 1). Further, this event captured the attention of 
President Carter who, in an election year, used the event as a motivator for the 1980 enactment 
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) or 
Superfund.  Under this Act, chemical companies (among others) would be charged a feedstock 
tax to cover its funding and, more importantly, would be responsible for cleaning up the 
thousands of other abandoned waste sites around the country (Scheffer, 1991).  This leads us to 
the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 4: The Status of the Players. The greater the status of the players involved or 
affected by the event, the greater the likelihood that it will trigger an examination of an 
industry’s image and the likelihood of industry-level attention. 
We observed, further, that if an event has implications for the core technologies of 
organizations in the industry and the process by which it accomplishes its goals, it will be more 
likely to draw attention. These technologies are the set of tangible and intangible assets involved 
in the production of goods and services relative to the event being examined. For example, Silent 
Spring (and Earth Day 1970) presented a direct challenge to the core technologies of the 
industry, namely chemical products and production processes (Florman, 1976; Pillar, 1991).  The 
Limits to Growth, on the other hand, was classified in terms of the long-standing Malthusian 
argument of limited resources on a broad societal scale.  It presented a challenge to industrial 
systems in general and not chemical industry technology in particular.  The Burmah Agate and 
Exxon Valdez spills had implications for ancillary aspects of industry activities — material 
transport and cleanup technology.  This contributed little to the industry-level attention they 
received.  Love Canal had moderate implications for the industry’s core technology.  Although 
articles in Chemical Week treated the issue as a new problem for which it could not be held 
accountable arguing that this was the “standard disposal practice of the 1940s and 1950s” 
(Chemical Week, 8/16/78: 15), most chemical companies had waste materials to be handled and 
likely had connections to a series of abandoned waste sites like Love Canal. Therefore, the event 
cast a critical light and new challenge on all chemical production processes.These observations 
led us to develop our fifth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The Implications for the Core Technology. The greater the determinants 
or consequences of the event on the core technology of industry members, the greater the 
examination of the industry image and the likelihood of industry-level attention. 
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Question 2: Events as Issues  
Of all the events publicly attended, only a few receive sustained attention and become 
critical issues for the industry.  As per our Research Question 2, we continued our analysis to 
consider why this might be so. As we observed in Table 2, two events received significantly 
more sustained internal attention than the others — Silent Spring and Love Canal. For the other 
four events attended to, little or no attention to the event was received after the first month.  
While a search for accountability can bring the event into the realm of the industry’s attention, 
the industry then responds to and accounts for the event (Elsbach, 1994), and continues to attend 
to the event or not.  For purposes of our discussion, we classify those with continuing attention 
as critical issues and those whose public attention is more ephemeral as non-critical.  Extending 
the definition of issues to the industry level, we define critical issues as events, developments, 
and trends that members of the industry recognize as having important consequences for the 
industry and which receive continued attention (Dutton, 1988; Elsbach, 1994).  
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
In examining the events that received industry attention, we observed that some events, 
such as Silent Spring and Love Canal invoked heated debate among various players over their 
meaning and implications and became critical issues while others did not (see Table 5).  Elsbach 
(1994) found a similar process in her study of the construction of verbal accounts by the cattle 
industry, where she observed either denials or acknowledgments of external accounts leading to 
debates over accountability.  
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In our between case comparison, we observed that the more contested the varying 
interpretations of meaning, the more sustained the levels of attention, and, in turn, the greater 
likelihood an event will emerge as an issue for an industry.  For example, Silent Spring, as we 
noted previously, invoked a debate among high status players over the safety and ethics of 
pesticide application and synthetic chemical production.  For the chemical industry, the book 
came to exemplify an ongoing, public misunderstanding of scientific advancement, and the 
perceived opposition to that advancement from environmentalists.  In the face of tremendous 
outcry, the industry, concerned with maintaining its image and identity, saw a need for balanced 
consideration of the risks and benefits of chemical technology and products.  One Chemical 
Week editorial presented a defense of the industry’s identity from environmentalist attacks, “in 
pest control - as in medicine, law, or international diplomacy - we must weigh risks against 
benefits . . . Is the survival of civilization worth a few pounds of fallout?”  The journal dismissed 
those challenging this notion as “a motley lot ranging from superstitious illiterates and cultists to 
educated scientists” (Chemical Week, 7/28/62: 5) and argued that the chemical industry's 
“research is aimed at profit through knowledge - not the sale of more and more pesticides 
whether they kill us or not.  Such a 'public be damned' attitude was outmoded some years ago” 
(Chemical Week, 7/14/62: 5).  A faith in this argument was a recurring theme in response to 
Love Canal as well.  Chemical Week argued that, although waste sites were an issue of concern, 
industry accountability was low since “Every so often something goes wrong” (Chemical Week, 
8/16/78: 5).  The event became a battle ground among environmental groups, the media, the legal 
community and industry over responsibility for a newly emerging by-product of chemical 
production, abandoned hazardous waste sites.   
We propose that both Love Canal and Silent Spring received sustained industry attention 
because they represented competing enactments over the degree of accountability of the industry.  
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In each case, the event was enacted by the chemical industry as critical its' identity. More than 
just article coverage in Chemical Week, Silent Spring received more editorial coverage than any 
of the other events in this study.  And Love Canal was considered so important to the identity of 
the industry that Chemical Week introduced a new department called "disposal" as a monthly 
feature to "focus on happenings in the area of managing hazardous wastes" (Chemical Week, 
11/1/78: 67). In both cases, outsiders’ enactments of the events contradicted the industry’s own 
identity, leading to continued discrepancy and contestation between insiders and outsiders over 
the event’s enactment. 
In contrast, contestation over the interpretations of The Limits to Growth and the Exxon 
Valdez spill remained low.  The book The Limits to Growth came and went within the pages of 
the journal with only one review.  The industry’s identity was not threatened and no debate was 
initiated.  And contestation over the Exxon Valdez spill centered on the responsibility of Exxon 
and the ship’s captain.  It triggered familiar routines, being similar in technology and content to 
that of oil spills dating back to the 1960s.  One article explicitly cited comparisons to the Torrey 
Canyon oil spill in 1967 (Chemical Week, 5/31/89: 6). While a low level of contestation over the 
efficacy of dispersants triggered some discussion within Chemical Week and the New York 
Times, it appeared that the members of the chemical industry did not dispute their questionable 
abilities and results.  Given their unproven track record, if the dispersants did not work, the 
negative implications would be minor.  If they did work, the positive implications would bolster 
industry identity and image.  In the end, while attended to by the industry, the event did not 
contradict the industry’s identity nor become an issue of important consequence.   
Similarly, Earth Day 1970 marked the formation of a new form of organized protest and 
resistance to industrial pollution, but chemical manufacturers enacted the event as being of 
limited consequence for the industry.  There was no real engagement between the chemical 
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industry and this newly emerging environmental movement.  The 1990 reenactment of Earth Day 
also remained an unjoined debate.  This time there was no confrontational environmental 
movement to engage.  The combined evidence from our case comparison leads us to our sixth 
and final hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6: Contested Enactments: The greater the contradiction between outsiders’ 
enactment of the event and the industry’s identity, the greater the contestation between insiders 
and outsiders over the enactment of the event. The greater the contestation over the event’s 
enactment, the greater the likelihood the event will receive high and sustained levels of attention.  
 
A Model of Industry Attention to Events 
We combine the insights derived from our cross-comparison of cases into an overall 
theoretical model, shown in Figure 1. The model was developed from our data analysis and 
verification, as informed by theory on attention and identity. Consistent with our research 
question, the model distinguishes between the industry’s initial public attention to an event, and 
whether public attention is sustained and leads to the enactment of the event as critical to the 
industry. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
In Figure 1 the solid boxes contain key constructs directly observed and recorded for all 
the cases studied. The solid lines depict the theoretical relationships that are the foci of this 
paper. The boxes surrounded by dotted lines show constructs that were not directly observed or 
recorded but that emerged from the analysis. The dotted-line relationships depict relationships 
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between constructs that also emerged from the analysis of cases, but which were not directly part 
of our research questions. 
Non-Routine Events. In the model, an industry’s external environment is a source of 
constant stimuli.  External events are constantly emerging, at times provoking industry-level 
attention and at other times being ignored. The model focuses on attention to non-routine events, 
which depart from the normal, ongoing industry activities, and for which responses are not 
readily available. 
Salience of the Event. While social salience was not an initial focus of our study, our 
research findings show that the salience of an event to the industry distinguishes whether an 
event is initially attended to or not. According to cognitive research, social saliency is a key 
determinant of whether a stimuli, such as an external event is attended or not (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991: 247-254). Social salience is defined as the prominence or importance of a stimulus to a 
particular social context. Both outsiders’ attribution of accountability and insiders’ examination 
of an industry image increase the saliency of an event for the industry and will therefore receive 
public attention by the industry. Events that are not socially salient for the industry, such as the 
Burmah Agate and the Cuyahoga River fire, are not attended to.The six other events were all 
viewed as salient to the industry, either by outsiders or by insiders. Our research and model 
differs from past theory however which suggests that critical novelty and incongruity, key 
characteristics of the salience of an event are a precursor to public attention and sensemaking 
(Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988; Weick, 1995). While novelty or 
incongruities alone may be necessary conditions they are insufficient to explain public attention. 
As we discovered in our analysis, while both the discovery of hazardous waste pollution in Love 
Canal and the Cuyahoga River fire in Cleveland were novel events, the former gained the 
sustained attention of the national, financial, and the chemical industry press while the latter 
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passed unattended. Our model posits that the salience of the event to an industry is moderated by 
outsiders’ public attention to an event and by insiders’ enactments of the event. 
Outsiders’ Public Attention. As noted earlier in our analysis, the level of outsiders’ 
public attention to an event was imperfectly related to the industry-level attention. In examining 
its effects, our model focuses instead on how outsider’s attention linked the event to the industry.  
Insider’s Enactments. The variety of insiders’ enactments of the events were not 
directly observed, but were only recorded when the event was publicly attended. Our data 
suggests, however, that whether and how an event is attended to by the industrial sector is the 
product of many factors beyond any strict assessment of its objective characteristics, but is 
affected instead by how insiders enacted the event in question.  Attention and enactment 
processes become the products of the industry’s interpretation of the event.  And as shown by the 
articles and editorials in Chemical Week, the industry’s enactment of the events differed from 
outsiders’ enactments as recorded in the general and financial press.  
Attributions of Accountability and Examination of Image.  Going beyond existing 
theories on public attention to events and issues (Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988), our model 
identifies two mechanisms – outsiders’ attributions of accountability and insiders’ examination 
of industry image – as shaping the industry’s initial public attention. In our model, the industry 
press serves as the conduit between outsiders’ attributions and insiders’ self-examination.  We 
posit that industries are more likely to publicly attend to an event under two conditions: (a) when 
they are held publicly accountable for that event, thereby affecting the industry's reputation; or 
(b) industry insiders conduct a self-examination of how the event may affect their image. In both 
instances the industry's initial public attention is determined directly or indirectly by concerns 
with outsiders’ views of the industry and its reputation. Outsiders’ concerns with an industry’s 
accountability make an event more salient and determine whether an event is publicly attended 
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or not. For the case of outsiders’ attributions of accountability these concerns reflect previously 
recorded assignments of the industry’s credit or blame for the event, as in Silent Spring and the 
two Earth Days. But as shown by the Exxon Valdez spill and The Limits to Growth, the 
industry’s concern with its external image may itself trigger public attention, even if outsiders do 
not directly make the industry accountable.  
Social Structures of Attention. Our data and inferences show that objective measures of 
an external event are only partially important in the enactment of that incident.  Structural factors 
(such as the rules of the game, the status of the players and the implications for the core 
technology) shape industry enactments of external events and whether the industry’s becomes 
concerned with how the event affects its image. The existing institutional rules, norms and 
beliefs are important determinants of the industry enactment process.   
Contestation and Contradiction.  Our model is consistent with prior research on events 
which highlights how event enactments are an unfolding process (Isabella, 1990; Barr, 1998). 
Although not the focus of our research, we observed that following initial public attention to an 
event, both outsiders and insiders had continuing enactments and re-enactments both of the 
initial event and of the subsequent responses by the industry and external actors. In seeking to 
explain whether public attention is sustained within an industry and an event becomes a critical 
issue, our model examines the effect of the subsequent enacted responses to the event and its 
aftermath both by outsiders and insiders. 
Our examination of event attention supports the view of social information processing as 
inherently political (Tetlock, 1990; Ocasio, 1997). Our model posits the importance of 
contestation (White, 1992; Ocasio, 1994) to explain whether and how some events were 
perceived to be of critical importance by the industry.  Contestation (White, 1992) refers to 
contests for control among disparate players and their identities (whether individual, group, 
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organizational, or supra organizational) that lead to competing perspectives of institutional 
reality and of the meaning of the event in question. Our model highlights the contested 
enactments between outsiders and insiders. This contest over what meaning to assign to the event 
results in an increased likelihood that an event will be understood as an issue of consequence to 
the industry and that public attention will be sustained over time.  Industry constituents act like 
politicians (Tetlock, 1990), either through a common voice such as a trade association, trade 
journal or through high status players, seeking to achieve and maintain the industry’s identity.  
Event attentional processing becomes a contest over meaning among players both inside and 
outside the industry (Hannigan, 1996).  This discourse is highly subject to the politics of the 
participants involved, overlain by the dominant logics and rules of the game prevailing at the 
time.  The level of contestation is representative of the cultural context in which it occurs, as 
reflected by the industry’s identity, as much as it is driven by the political context.  
The challenges to industry identity involve the search for new answers and the rejection 
of available responses.  For example, if the industry can invoke existing routinized answers to 
the external challenge, then the external challenge can go unengaged and the event will not 
become an “issue” for the industry.  But, if high levels of contradictions exist between the 
enactments of the events by outsiders, and the prevailing industry identity, as in the cases of 
Silent Spring and Love Canal, then contestation among these competing interpretations will 
occur and the event will be understood as an important issue.   
Our theory and evidence suggest that contradictions with an industry’s identity are more 
critical than concerns with its external image in sustaining public attention.  For example, the 
first Earth Day did not become a critical issue for the industry despite the continuing threat to the 
industry’s external image. Earth Day could be more readily ignored because student activists 
were viewed as political actors uninformed by science and the industry’s scientific identity was 
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not directly threatened.  The case of Silent Spring, however, highlights the contradictions 
between the industry’s identity as a scientific enterprise in the pursuit of progress, and the 
continued critiques by prominent scientists of the health hazards of chemical manufacturing. 
Scientific critiques could not be readily responded to as political attacks, and this led to 
continued contestation over the meaning and findings of Silent Spring.  
Event Re-Enactment.  The influence of the institutional order alters how an event is 
enacted, not only at the time of its occurrence, but also how it can be “re-enacted” after it has 
occurred.  As industries and institutional arrangements evolve, events can be retroactively 
enacted to fit the new social structures.  This could be offered as a third stage in our model, one 
that is disconnected from the progression we describe whereby events reemerge as social 
structures evolve.  In this study, three events have become re-enacted in this way — the 
Cuyahoga River Fire, Earth Day and Silent Spring.  The Cuyahoga River Fire has been re-
enacted through the pronouncements of agency officials as a seminal event in environmental 
history (Opheim, 1993; Browner, 1994).  Yet, although the event evocatively highlights how far 
water quality has been improved in the thirty years since it occurred, the event failed to gain 
wide-spread notoriety in 1969 as representing an issue that must be dealt with in the national 
agenda.  It was a local issue regarding a river fire, an event that was not without precedent on 
other waterways nationally.   
The example of Earth Day shows how concerted attempts were made to reenact the event 
on a yearly basis, but with little success.  Earth Day 1971 and 1972 as a repeated holiday were 
failures.  The event was, however, well attended on its re-enactment on its twenty year 
anniversary in 1990.  Yet, such a re-enactment must, by our explanation, reflect the institutional 
context of 1990 and not that of twenty years before.  It was, in fact, enacted in such a way, 
leading many to feel that the spirit and meaning of the event had been altered dramatically.  It 
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was enacted in a new form and function that lacked the grass roots protest that defined it in 1970.  
Finally, the event of Silent Spring has been claimed by many as the beginning of the modern 
environmental movement (Gottlieb, 1993; Scheffer, 1991).  Yet, such retroactive claims deny the 
reality that no such environmental movement existed until well after the book's release.  Neither 
the chemical industry nor Rachel Carson would likely have referred to herself an 
environmentalist.  Aside from the fact that the term had no meaning in 1962, she was seen (and 
saw herself) as a scientist, collecting scientific data to make a scientific argument about the 
harmful side-effects of technological advancement.  She did not argue against the use of 
pesticides, but rather for their responsible use (Brooks, 1972).  To mark the beginning of a 
movement with an event that preceded the formation of that movement by at least eight years - 
around the events of the passage of the National Environmental Policy Act, the first Earth Day 




This paper makes several contributions to our understanding of industry events and their 
enactment.  We have developed a theoretical model of industry attention to events that draws 
connections between the social and structural factors affecting the industry and the level of 
attention to events.  While many have considered the role of events at the level of the individual 
(Weick, 1979) or the organization (Meyer, 1982; Dutton and Dukerich, 1991), a primary 
contribution of this paper is to consider attention to an event at the level of the industrial sector.  
And while others have considered the role of events in organizational change processes (Meyer, 
1982; Meyer, Brooks and Goes, 1990), what has been lacking is a model for discerning why 
these processes are engaged for some events while not for others.  In combining our industry 
 41 
level analysis with the model of event attention, this paper contributes to theory by drawing 
critical linkages among several important literatures.   
We have applied the concepts of accountability (Tetlock, 1990) and contestation (White, 
1992) to the industry level, using them to explain how industries attend to events.  In this 
attentional process, image and identity become dominant considerations in the process by which 
industries pay attention to events.  Competing attributions of accountability can challenge the 
industry’s identity, creating both contestation among diverse players and competing enactments 
of the event.  Alternatively, an internal examination of an industry’s image may also trigger 
initial attention. Our model posits, however, that sustained levels of public attention require 
contestation between insiders and outsiders over the enactment of the event.2 The introduction of 
the concept of contestation can have broad implications across many levels of analysis, including 
institutional formation and institutional change as well as the integration of political processes 
and individual agency into institutional processes.   
This paper also makes several contributions to the literature on attention (March and 
Olsen, 1976; Dutton, 1988; Ocasio, 1997).  First, it extends the study of organizational attention 
to the industry level.  Second, it provides an empirical examination of industry attention and 
inattention, by examining one important communication channel within the industry, the 
business press.  Third it develops a model of attention that links industry identity with political 
contestation over the industry’s image and identity.  Finally, the paper suggests that the search 
for accountability is a key factor in determining attention to events. 
                                                 
2 As noticed by an anonymous reviewer, most of the events in our study, with the exception of Earth Day 1990 and 
possibly the cleanup of the Exxon Valdez, were potentially negative for the industry. As suggested by the literature 
on opportunities and threats (Dutton and Jackson, 1987) positive events are more likely to be enacted as 
opportunities and are less likely to lead to sustained attention.  But further research with a greater sample of positive 
events is required to determine whether contested enactments are also a precondition for sustained attention for 
positive events. 
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Finally, this paper suggests that institutional arrangements play a prominent role in the 
initial attention to external events.  Other research suggests that external events play a prominent 
role in the development and alteration of institutional arrangements (Hoffman, 1997; 1999).  
Combining both research ideas, the process becomes recursive.  Social structure is both the 
medium and the outcome of the events that transpire (Giddens, 1979).  One result in conducting 
this particular study has been to understand the former aspect of this institution-event 
relationship.  While this model has been developed to explain environmental events in the 
industry of US chemical production, future research may test the model, the resulting hypotheses 
and their applicability to other fields, to other types of events and at other levels of analysis.   
Our interest in this study is to understand how external events are attended to within the 
industrial sector.  Our objective in future work is to understand how these events, once attended 
to, can alter institutional arrangements.  There are few theories about changes within institutions 
and one hypothesis we hope to pursue is whether industry attention to events is a necessary 
condition for institutional change.  Before this hypothesis can be pursued, however, the process 
by which external events enter the institutional environment must first be explained.  That is one 
goal of this paper, to provide a template for this explanation.  Attentional processes define events 
in terms of the interests and identities of the industrial sector as it exists within an institutional 
context.  Competing interests engage in contestation over competing attributions of 
accountability and events.  This form of institutional contest, we hypothesize, forms the 
foundation by which institutional shifts can occur.  In our future work, we will expand upon this 
hypothesis and elaborate further on industry evolution and institutional change process. 
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Paired Comparison Event Sample 
 
1.  The Cuyahoga River Fire, June 23, 1969, and 
2.  The Declaration of a Health Hazard at Love Canal, New York, August 2, 1978. 
 
3.  The Burmah Agate Oil Spill, November 1, 1979, and 
4.  The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, March 24, 1989. 
 
5.  The First Earth Day, April 22, 1970, and 
6.  Earth Day, April 22, 1990 
 
7.  The Publication of Silent Spring, September 27, 1962, and 
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Industry Attention to Environmental Events: 
 
Contestation over Event Interpretation 
 































































































































Salience of  






Structural Determinants of  
Industry Attention: 
• Congruence with Rules of the Game 
• Status of the Players 




























Focus of Current Study 
Additional Relationships 
